Threat ResearchAndroid remote access trojan (RAT) / banking trojan used for on-device fraudMay 2024Analyzed 2026-09-08

BingoMod: recovered C2 indicators & analysis

BingoMod is an Android remote access trojan, first documented by Cleafy in 2024, that abuses Accessibility Services to perform live-operator on-device fraud (account takeover money transfers) and then typically wipes the infected device to hinder forensic analysis.

What BingoMod is

BingoMod is an Android remote access trojan (RAT) discovered and analyzed by the Cleafy Threat Intelligence and Response (TIR) team at the end of May 2024. Because researchers could not tie it to any known family, they named it BingoMod. Its principal objective is to initiate fraudulent money transfers directly from a victim's compromised device via account takeover (ATO), using the On-Device Fraud (ODF) technique so that transactions originate from the trusted device and bypass many authentication, verification, and behavioral fraud-detection controls.

The malware is distributed through smishing (SMS phishing) campaigns and side-loading, masquerading as a legitimate mobile security or antivirus tool (and, in some samples, a Chrome update). After installation it social-engineers the user into granting Accessibility Services, which it then abuses to read on-screen content (credentials, account balances), log keystrokes, intercept SMS messages, and programmatically drive the user interface. It establishes a socket-based channel with its command-and-control (C2) infrastructure to receive roughly 40 remote commands, and uses a separate HTTP-based channel to exfiltrate screen images. Screen content is captured through the Android Media Projection API, giving operators a VNC-like real-time view, while accessibility-driven input injection lets them tap buttons, fill forms, and navigate between apps.

The money-transfer operations are not fully automated: they rely on a live human operator interacting with the device in real time, with individual transfers reported at up to approximately EUR 15,000. BingoMod also supports overlay attacks and fake notifications for phishing, transmission of fake SMS messages, and the blocking or uninstalling of applications to evade defenses. A notable feature is a device-wiping capability: after a successful fraudulent transfer, the malware typically wipes the device (documented against external storage, with a suspected but less-certain capability for a fuller reset) to remove traces and obstruct incident response, behavior researchers compared to the earlier BRATA malware.

At the time of reporting, Cleafy assessed BingoMod as being in an active development phase, with authors focused on experimenting with obfuscation to lower antivirus detection rates rather than expanding functionality. The malware supports English, Romanian, and Italian, and code comments and telemetry led researchers to attribute it, with moderate confidence, to a likely Romanian-speaking developer or group.

Capabilities

Known C2 / channel types: Raw TCP socket (command channel), HTTP (screen-image / data exfiltration channel).

MITRE ATT&CK (Mobile)

Techniques commonly associated with BingoMod:

IDTechnique
T1417Input Capture
T1516Input Injection
T1513Screen Capture
T1582SMS Control
T1636Protected User Data
T1437Application Layer Protocol

What Privara Unmask recovered

Two C2 ports on the same host were recovered from the executed sample. A separately-observed Cloudflare address (104.24.181.7) is a fronting IP and was excluded as low-confidence. The analysis ran on a de-emulated Android 17 device that the sample could not fingerprint as virtual, so it behaved as it would on a real handset.

Package p1a1fa04c.pae25061e.p658c02c8
SHA-256 a769c40ce48a38eed8897447081fc002d567535943befc4b51d866d134953588
Source MalwareBazaar (abuse.ch)
Community contribution. Contributed to ThreatFox as net-new intelligence on 2026-09-08 (TAJ APPS account).

Indicators of compromise (IOCs)

IndicatorTypeRoleConfidenceStatus
23.254.226.46:8055ip:portC2highoffline
23.254.226.46:13500ip:portC2highoffline
Status note. The indicators above were unresponsive (offline / sinkholed) at analysis time and are published as historical threat intelligence. Co-observed benign and environmental artifacts have been removed rather than reported as C2.

External references

Methodology & honest limits

This sample was obtained from MalwareBazaar and detonated in a controlled, isolated environment. C2 identity was recovered from the executing sample and its configuration. We report only what the analysis established: an offline sample yields a C2 identity, not a live beacon, and we say so. Nothing here is inferred beyond the evidence.

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